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Summary Description
Trustworthy Autonomy Development and Flight Demonstration
Technical Approach
 Leverage Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO) development of a 
run-time assurance architecture sufficient to support all safety aspects of the 
selected missions
 Collect test data of the system sufficient to support the safety case on a sub-
scale aircraft
 Conduct a joint NASA/FAA review of the safety risks of the selected missions 
identifying performance or data gaps to make the proposed safety case
 Conduct the autonomy flight demonstrations using procedural and test safety 
mitigation where gaps exist
Partnerships, Workforce, and Facilities
 Partners: FAA, DoD, Industry
 Workforce: $247,000 procurement
 Facilities:  NASA Armstrong and Edwards test ranges
 Impacts: This proposal augments an ongoing NASA Armstrong SASO effort
Needs: This effort addresses methodology for certifying autonomous systems 
Goals/Objectives
Broaden NASA, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Department of 
Defense (DoD) collaboration to develop a coordinated government position on the 
relevance of using a run time assurance architecture to address flight safety for an 
autonomous aircraft to execute select real-world missions
Deliverables: Joint FAA/NASA assessment on the use of a run time assurance 
approach to address the flight safety requirements of an autonomous aircraft
Next logical step: Upon successful completion:
 Address gaps identified in the safety review
 Move system to full-scale aircraft
Benefit to community: Develops a path to certifying autonomous aircraft
Thrust 6 Assured Autonomy Research ThemeVehicle-Centric Autonomy
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The Challenge of Autonomy
 Verification and certification of a complex system
 Possible solution: run-time assurance (RTA)
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Multi-Monitor Run-Time Assurance (MM-RTA)
With Risk-Based Decision Making
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Multi-Monitor Run-Time Assurance (MM-RTA)
Research Goal: Develop a methodology for certifying 
unmanned and autonomous systems using software 
architecture testbeds 
 Use research findings to inform standards and best 
practices which will accelerate the certification of 
autonomous systems
 MM-RTA research findings using Low-Altitude Small 
Unmanned Aircraft System Test Range (LASUTR) and 
Expandable Variable Autonomy Architecture (EVAA) 
realistic environment capabilities
 Develop a methodology for generating the artifacts 
necessary to develop an an airworthiness case for 
unmanned and autonomous systems
Armstrong Flight Research Center 7
Informing Standards
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Engaging the Standards Community
Research findings vetted with ASTM International through 
Working Group 53403 (WK53403)
 WK53403 Goal: Develop a standard practice that safely bounds the 
flight behavior of autonomous unmanned aircraft system (UAS)
 Involvement originated from NASA Armstrong collaboration with FAA 
regarding automated ground collision avoidance system (GCAS) and 
integrity management work on early autonomy concepts
 NASA Armstrong is collaborating with the FAA and ASTM by sharing 
research findings, techniques, best practices, and lessons learned 
throughout development of MM-RTA
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Traditional RTA Framework
Baseline Aircraft
RTA Trusted Functions
Untrusted Controllers
Legend
Sensors
Recovery
Controller
RTA Input 
Manager
Ve
hi
cle
 M
an
ag
em
en
t S
ys
te
m
Safety Monitor
Sensors
RTA
Switch
Untrusted 
System
Sensors
SensorsSensors
Armstrong Flight Research Center 10
Informing Standards – Accomplishments
FAA
 NASA Armstrong coordination of MM-RTA (Summer 2015)
 National workshop (November 2015)
 ASTM request (December 2015)
 Initiation of research toward a Part 23 rewrite (May 2016)
Joint Review
 Traveler Phase 1 testing (June 2017)
 NASA Armstrong gap feedback to ASTM (June 2017)
ASTM
 WK53403 established (February 2016)
 Draft standard practice complete (November 2016)
 Published standard practice (Summer 2017)
 NASA white paper augmenting standard practice (Summer 2017)
Use of NASA Armstrong MM-RTA and Enhanced Standard
 Industry package delivery use (starting in Spring 2017)
COMPLETE
PLANNED
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Multi-Monitor Run-Time Assurance
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MM-RTA Framework
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Expandable Variable Autonomy Architecture (EVAA)
Software Research Testbed for MM-RTA
 Modular software architecture
 Add and replace software components as needed for developing 
research findings in a relevant environment
RTA Switch and Decider
 Selects what function should be controlling the aircraft 
at any instance in time
 Risk-based decision making
Monitors
 Ground collision avoidance with obstacle awareness
 GeoFence – precisely staying within approved airspace
 Forced landing system – contingency management mitigating 
the consequences of the aircraft’s actions
 Social interface functions – autonomy expressing Intent
Controllers
 Conventional autopilot functions available on most aircraft and all UAVs
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Expandable Part of EVAA
A software testbed providing a 
flexible framework for autonomy 
algorithm research
 Allows software growth for 
future research
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Command, Control, and Monitoring Architecture
During Test and Evaluation
RT mon.
RT mon.
Traveler
GCS
Mission System and EVAA
Core
Flight Control
Computer
Safety Pilot
Test Director
and Safety Officer
System
Monitors
CellularSafety Pilot-C2Test Safety
Only
Monitoring
Only
System Control
Test-C2
Test Only
COTS
GCS
COTS-C2
Emergencies
Only
POCs
Situational 
awareness 
monitor
A/C vector/Map
and safety pilot
TRAVELER
SYSTEM
Monitoring
Only
RC
Controller
Purple text and lines 
indicate the core 
autonomous system.
Lighting & 
Sound
LASUTR
TSPI
UTM
Brown text and lines 
indicate flight test 
only components.
Armstrong Flight Research Center 16
MM-RTA: Key EVAA Accomplishments
Aircraft/Testbed Modifications
 Research processor integrated January 17
 Sound and lighting system installed May 17
Research System
 Functional requirements completed November 16
 Design completed February 17
 Coding completed March 17
 Patent for GCAS monitor issued May 17
V&V
 Hardware in the loop sim completed Mar 17
 Integrated V&V completed May 17
Flight Test
 Aircraft characterization test completed March 17
 EVAA flight test began May 17
Reporting
 Update to FAA and ASTM May 17
17
Flight Controls
Research Processor
Development 
Environment HITLS
LIDAR data for obstacle avoidance
MM-RTA Flight Test Begun
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Generating Artifacts for Airworthiness
Armstrong Flight Research Center 18
What is LASUTR?
What is LASUTR?
 A variety of environmental settings
› Buildings: Large to small
› Obstacles: Cell-tower, power lines, etc.
› Routes for flight/mission conduct: Up to 
25-mile loop
› Terrain variations
 Smooth, hills, mountains
 2,000 to 14,000 mean sea level (MSL) 
elevations
› Access: Most assets are within 
a few 100 yards of office space
 Validated range instrumentation
› Tracking: A validated independent 
position truth source with centimeter accuracy
› Weather: Localized measurements
› Ground/obstacle mapping: A validated dataset
› Video documentation
› Time-correlated
Ground mapping LIDAR
Long-range optics
Spot wind instrumentation
Tracking instrumentation
Vehicle controllability
1. Where is the aircraft?
2. Where is its surrounding environment?
3. How is the environment affecting the aircraft?
Easily replicated at any test site
1. No in-the-ground infrastructure
2. Solar/battery powered
3. Affordable
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LASUTR Areas
Three Areas
 North of NASA Armstrong (3.3 square miles)
 Northwest corner of Edwards Air Force Base (25 square miles)
 10 miles east of Big Pine (50 square miles)
Forbes Areas
Sopp Road Area
Coyote Flats Area
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Range Instrumentation
Time-space positioning information (TSPI)
 Truth source for aircraft position
 < ½-pound add-on to aircraft
 Anticipated centimeter (cm) accuracy
Ground mapping Light Detection and 
Ranging (LIDAR)
 Geo-referenced truth for ground obstacles
 Anticipated cm accuracy
Long range optics 
tracking video
 Image-track
 Accuracy +/- 4 inches 
at 2,000 feet
Spot winds and video
Time-correlated
Geo-referenced ground mapping LIDAR data
TSPI – Independent position data
Long-
range 
optics 
(LRO)
Spot
winds
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Generating Artifacts – Accomplishments
Flight Ranges
 Forbes range established and being used: Test obstacles ready for testing
 Sopp Road range established: Modest terrain variations ready for testing
 Coyote Flats test range established and being used: High-altitude testing and extreme terrain and foliage
Range Instrumentation
 Independent TSPI: Developed and functioning
 Ground mapping LIDAR for obstacle/feature data: 
Developed and functioning
 Spot weather instrumentation: Developed and 
functioning
 Long range tracking optics: Developed
COMPLETE
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Conclusion
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Linkages to National Research Council (NRC) Autonomy Barriers
Autonomy Barriers Traveler Response
Communications and data acquisition Indirectly addressed 
Cyber-physical security Addressed
Decision making by adaptive/nondeterministic systems Addressed
Diversity of aircraft Addressed
Human-machine interface Addressed
Sensing, perception and cognition Partially addressed
System complexity and resilience Addressed at vehicle level
Verification and validation Addressed
Airspace access for unmanned aircraft Indirectly and partially addressed 
Certification process Offers an approach 
Equivalent level of safety Addressed
Trust in adaptive/nondeterministic systems Addressed
Legal issues Partially addressed 
Social issues Partially addressed 
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Discussion

